Entry 014: Constitutional Amendment Process — Protection from Takeover

Decision

OLN's Constitution distinguishes between operational governance (everyday decisions about platform operation, Franchise affairs, content disputes) and constitutional matters (changes to the Constitution itself, Need-vs-Greed caps, the acquisition principle, the dilution mechanic, the no-founder-exception rule, contribution categories, voting mechanism parameters, Foundation board structure).

Operational governance uses linear Power weighting and standard voting cycles.

Constitutional matters require a stacked supermajority with multiple independent locks:

High supermajority of weighted Power voting in favor (specific threshold deferred — likely 70-80%)
Quadratic voting rather than linear (dilutes influence of any concentrated voting bloc)
Cooldown period between proposal and vote (likely 60-90 days; rushed amendments are typically captured amendments)
Foundation board ratification — the board has unilateral authority to refuse mission-violating amendments even if contributors vote for them

The Foundation board mission lock

This is the deepest constitutional defense. Operational governance flows from contributors. Constitutional change requires both contributor supermajority and Foundation board ratification. The board's role is mission stewardship — it cannot push amendments through against contributor will, but it can refuse to ratify amendments that violate the mission even if contributors vote for them.

Founders whose Power has waned can still serve a board term (board terms are fixed, not Power-weighted). This creates the right asymmetry: financial equity (Corp), Power (relative to growth, dilutes with engagement), and board seat (appointed/elected, term-limited) are three distinct things that don't have to move together.

Defenses against capture vectors

Coordinated contributor takeover. Quadratic voting + supermajority + cooldown + board ratification. Even if an adversary recruits a large coordinated bloc, quadratic dilution and the board lock remain.

Veteran fade attack. Eliminated by dilution (Entry 012). Founders' absolute Power persists; adversaries must outgrow rather than outwait.

Acquisition pressure. Entry 006 already requires public before/after case. Constitutional amendment to weaken Need-vs-Greed or acquisition rules requires the full stacked supermajority.

Capture-by-funding. The Foundation board structure is the primary defense. A funding offer conditional on governance changes runs into board ratification. Board members can refuse on mission grounds.

Rubric capture. Rubric categories and relative weights between categories are constitutional-tier (see Entry 011). Within-category specifics are Franchise Team / Council discretion. This prevents rubric-shifting from being a low-bar attack surface.

Sybil-at-scale. G-004 (sybil resistance). Quadratic voting helps further.

The asymmetry that protects the mission

It is hard to push a constitutional amendment through (high stacked bar). It is easier to block one (you only need enough Power and/or board influence to deny supermajority). Founders with even diluted Power, plus board allies, plus the Foundation lock, plus quadratic voting on constitutional matters — collectively that's a strong defensive position even when founders are no longer the dominant contributors.

Founder Power as fire alarm

While founders are actively engaged, their Power is the constitutional defenders' early warning system. Founders will notice takeover patterns before anyone else because they understand what OLN is supposed to be. The defense isn't permanent founder veto — it's that engaged founders have meaningful Power to detect and oppose capture, and the constitutional architecture has multiple supermajority locks that mean even diluted founder Power is sufficient to block (though not push through) anti-mission changes.

Open questions